Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing Cases by Finkelstein, Michael O. & Levanbach, Hans
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF DAMAGES
IN PRICE-FIXING CASES
MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN* AND HANS LEVENBACHt
In an antitrust price-fixing case, damages are measured by the difference
between the prices paid by the plaintiff purchasers and the prices they would have
paid in the absence of defendants' conspiracy. Even small variations in the deter-
mination of these differences may become significant because plaintiffs are entitled
by statute to receive three times their actual damages.' Moreover, in a class action
there may be thousands of purchasers whose recoveries are based on an industry-
wide overcharge formula.
The difficulty of course lies in estimating the "but for" prices. An obvious idea
is to assume that competitive prices during the conspiracy period would have been
the same as they were before or after the conspiracy or in interludes of competition
within the conspiracy period. Thus, the difference between the conspiratorial
price and the actual price from other periods measures the damage. This estimate,
however, meets the immediate objection that it is likely to be incorrect because
changes in factors affecting price other than the conspiracy would have produced
changes in competitive prices if there had been competition during the conspiracy
period.
These arguments may be illustrated by Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. Genera/ Elecric
Co., 2 one of the well-known antitrust cases involving electrical equipment manu-
facturers. Plaintiffs contended that the purpose and effect of the manufacturers'
conspiracy was to keep transaction prices for large steam turbines close to book
prices; they proposed to measure damages by the difference between the average
11% discount during the conspiracy period and the average 25.33% discount that
prevailed after the conspiracy had been terminated. Defendants replied that eco-
nomic conditions for the sellers had worsened in the postconspiracy period and
that these conditions accounted for the increase in the discount. They pointed to
the presence for the first time of effective foreign competition, an increase in the
manufacturers' capacity to produce steam turbine generators (which caused an
oversupply), a lessening of growth in demand, and a drop in manufacturing costs
(which permitted defendants to offer their products at a lower price).
After a bench trial, District Judge Feinberg initially found that these factors
did account for some of the increase in the discount in the postconspiracy period.
He then confronted the question of how much. Treating the matter as one of
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"highly subjective" and "inexact" judgment, he concluded that 4.33 percentage
points of the 25.33% discount in the postconspiracy period was due to changes in
economic circumstances, leaving 21% attributable to the conspiracy. Since the
increase in the average discount was approximately 14 percentage points (from
approximately 11% to 25.33%), he thus attributed approximately one-third of the
increase to changes in economic conditions and two-thirds of the increase to the
conspiracy. I I
The court justified this type of subjective assessment of the discount by citing
"similar" judicial problems of fixing a figure for pain and suffering in a negligence
case or of selecting the percent of negligence for which the plaintiff was responsible
and hence could not recover in a Jones Act case.3 However, these examples are
not analogous. The judgments required in those types of cases are inevitably
highly subjective and there is no generally accepted way of translating them into
dollars. By contrast, determining the influence on price of various asserted eco-
nomic forces does not involve subjective values, but estimates made by the objec-
tive methods of econometrics. Since these methods are better known to economists
and statisticians-and perhaps even to judges and litigants-than they were in
1965 when Ohzo Valley was decided, it is probable that courts will require a party
arguing the effect of collateral circumstances to prove its point with this type of
evidence. Thus, econometrics may be used by plaintiffs who contend that the full
effect of a conspiracy is concealed by changes in other correlated factors that also
affect price, or by defendants who claim that part of a price change should be
attributable to other factors.
Several writers have explored the question of whether the statistical technique
of multiple regression could appropriately be used for this disentangling purpose.4
Based on theoretical considerations, the academic verdict is generally favorable.
However, practical experience with data sets used in several litigated cases suggests
considerable caution in requiring full fledged models as part of a prima facie case.
This article proposes to describe the cases in which models have been presented
and to discuss the issues they raise. 5 The discussion that follows is not highly tech-
nical, but the reader is assumed to be at least generally acquainted with the princi-
ples of multiple regression analysis. 6
3. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982), which incorporates for seamen the provisions of federal statutes
modifying common law remedies in cases of injury to railway employees. Among these statutes is 45
U.S.C. § 53 (1982), which provides that the jury may diminish a damage award in favor of an employee in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee.
4. See, e.g., Fisher, Multip/e Regression in Legal Proceedigs, 80 COLUM. L. RE\'. 702, 726-29 (1980); Har-
rison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REx'. 751, 783-87 (1980). J
Leitzinger, Regression Analysis In Antitrust Cases: Opening The Black Box, 20 The Philadelphia Lawyer 1
(1983); see also A. DAGGETT & FREEDMAN, ECONOMETRICS AND THE LAW: A CASE STUDY IN 5 HE PROOF
OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES (Dep't of Statistics, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, Technical Rep. No. 23, Sept. 1983).
5. Multiple regression analysis has been used in other antitrust contexts that are not discussed. For
example, regression models have been used by discontinued dealers to prove lost profits. Shreve Equip.,
Inc. v. Clay Equip. Corp., No. C75-242A (N.D. Ohio 1978); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 376 F.
Supp. 546 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd, 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842
(W.D. Pa. 1973). See also Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (Report of
Herbert Brownell, Special Master, at 94, 95).
6. For a description of multiple regression, see articles cited supra note 4. See also Finkelstein, Regression
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I
THE CASES
A. Corrugated Containers
In 1977, following the Supreme Court's decision in Un1tedStates v. Contatner Cor-
poration of America I that an exchange of price information constituted an antitrust
violation, purchasers of cardboard containers and corrugted sheets brought
treble-damage class actions against the manufacturers of these products.8 The
charge was price fixing between 1960 and 1976. A group of defendants settled by
putting up a fund of some $300 million. However, three defendants-Alton,
Mead, and Westvaco-refused to settle and stood trial before a jury. During the
trial, Alton and Westvaco settled for some $6.4 million, leaving Mead as the sole
defendant.
On the damage question, plaintiffs' expert, John Beyer, presented two similar
multiple regression models.9 In one study, the monthly average price per square
foot of corrugated containers and sheets shipped by members of the Fiber Box
Association (FBA) was regressed on (1) price the previous month; (2) change in
cost of production from the previous month; (3) level of manufacturing output in
industries using corrugated containers (a demand factor); (4) the wholesale price
index (WPI) for all commodities (justified as another demand factor, although the
reason is unclear); (5) the productive capacity of paperboard plants (a supply
factor); and (6) a dummy variable to reflect the period of price controls (a factor
which was given the value one in the period of price controls March 1971-March
1974 and zero otherwise). The data were all expressed in the form of index num-
bers. The period covered by the regression was January 1963 through December
1975 (156 monthly observations); it is during this period that price fixing was
deemed to have occurred. The regression equation was thus estimated solely from
data during the conspiracy period, and the estimated relationships are those
existing during the conspiracy. The fit appears to be very good, the square of the
multiple correlation coefficient (R 2) being greater than 0.99. A second model was
of the same form and used the same variables, except that the price of containers
was drawn from a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) price series (which uses the
price of a representative container rather than an average price as in the FBA
price series). 10
The estimated regression equation for the conspiracy period ending December
1975 was then used to estimate prices in the 1978-79 postconspiracy period. These
Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1442 (1973), reprintedin M. Finkelstein, QUANTITA-
TIVE METHODS IN LAW ch. 7 (1978).
7. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). The civil suits were triggered by a nationwide grand jury investigation of the
same conduct; this investigation was conducted in 1975 and 1976.
8. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1977). The discussion and
analysis of this case are based on the trial transcript, certain computer printout relied on by plaintiffs'
expert, John Beyer, workpapers of defendants' expert, Franklin Fisher, interviews with counsel, and the
authors' computer reanalysis of data from the first trial.
9. Transcript at 45-121 (July 22, 1980), In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
10. Variables 5 and 6 were subsequently dropped from the BLS model because they were not statisti-
cally significant in that model. Transcript at 86-87 (July 22, 1980).
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estimated prices were higher than the actual prices, the average of the difference
between the projected and actual prices as a percentage of the projected prices
being 7.8% for the BLS price studyI' and 19.1% for the FBA price study.
12 From
this, plaintiffs argued that the overcharge in the conspiracy period was at least
7.8%. Figure 1 is plaintiffs' exhibit of the BLS price data in the conspiracy and
postconspiracy periods, and the conspiracy prices as projected by the model.
Defendants challenged these estimates on various grounds, but they did not
introduce a competing model. The jury found that the overcharge was 5%. The
case was then sent to a special master to compute damages by applying a 5%
overcharge figure to the purchases by the plaintiffs in the conspiracy period.
While the case was pending before the special master, the parties settled with
Mead agreeing to pay $45 million over a ten year period.
A second trial followed for certain plaintiffs who had opted out of the first
class. Most defendants settled by putting up a fund of some $60 million. How-
11. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4852B, Transcript at 104 (July 22, 1980).
12. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4852A, Transcript at 95-102 (July 22, 1980).
ACTUAL PRICE
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ever, five defendants stood trial before a jury in late 1982 and early 1983. Beyer's
model was introduced again, this time with certain technical revisions in the
explanatory variables.13 Among other changes, the variables for the level of man-
ufacturing output and for WPI were refined; a variable for inventory of linerboard
was added; and costs were used instead of change in costs. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the period of collusion was ended a year earlier, this time in December 1974.
Thus, the period of transition to a fully competitive market was 1975-78 (for which
plaintiff also claimed damages) and the period of full competition was 1979
through August 1981 (the latest period for which data were available).
Using the same technique and relying solely on the FBA price series, Beyer
found a remarkable 26% industry-wide overcharge.14 He translated this by a com-
plex method into an overcharge for each plaintiff. This time, however, Beyer ran
into a withering attack from Franklin Fisher, an economist from MIT, who leveled
a barrage of criticism at the model and pronounced it "worthless."' 15 This article
discusses certain of Fisher's criticisms below. Evidently, these criticisms were effec-
tive because the jury found that there had been a conspiracy but that it had not
affected the prices paid by the opt-out plaintiffs. 16 Hence, there was no recovery in
the case.
B. Concrete Pipe
In the 1960's and 1970's, suits alleging price-fixing conspiracies were brought in
many states against concrete pipe manufacturers. In one of the first cases to be
tried, plaintiffs were the State Highway Department and certain municipalities of
New Mexico.' 7  Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' conspiracy extracted
overcharges on purchases of concrete pipe in New Mexico for the period January
1960 through December 1962. Other defendants having settled, the trial con-
cerned only fifty-two purchases in this period from defendant Martin-Marietta.
Plaintiffs argued that damages could not be computed on the basis of either
preconspiracy or postconspiracy prices because Martin-Marietta was in a
monopoly position in the preconspiracy period, and lingering effects of the con-
spiracy maintained pipe prices at noncompetitive levels in the postconspiracy
period. According to the plaintiffs, the only proper basis for comparison was the
last half of 1960, when a competitor briefly entered the field and prices dropped.
Damages for purchases in other periods were computed by comparing actual
prices with prices in the competitive period adjusted for changes in the BLS price
index for concrete products. This comparison indicated a 20% overcharge.
Defendant argued that plaintiffs' simple comparison of conspiratorial and com-
petitive periods was misleading because it failed to account for such factors as
13. Conversation with John E. Linville, one of the counsel in the case (June 22, 1983).
14. Transcript at 105 (Dec. 15, 1982). The damages estimated from the BLS price series were about
half those estimated from the FBA price series.
15. Transcript at 395-444 (Feb. 8, 1983).
16. The jury's decision may also have been affected by the argument that the plaintiffs, who were
large, sophisticated purchasers, were less likely to have been overcharged than the run of purchasers.
17. New Mexico v. American Pipe and Constr. Co., Civ. No. 7183 (D.N.M. 1970). The description
that follows is from Parker, Economics in the Courtroom: Proof of Damages In a Price-Fxing Case, 9 ANTITRUST
LAW & ECON. REV. No. 4, at 61 (1977) supplemented with further information from Professor Parker.
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transportation costs, quantity, and type of pipe. To reinforce its argument,
defendant regressed price per lineal foot on diameter of pipe and number of lineal
feet purchased. The equation (in linear logarithmic form) was estimated using
data from the nonconspiracy periods (1956-59 and January 1963 through March
1964). Defendant then argued that any price in the conspiratory period within a
95% confidence interval of the regression estimate must be accepted as normal.
Using the difference between the actual prices charged and the upper limit of the
95% confidence interval as the measure of the overcharge, defendant obtained a
negligible damage figure of $10,811.
Plaintiffs' expert, Alfred Parker of the University of New Mexico, presented a
regression model to rebut defendant's regression. Using the conspiratorial period
1960-62, he regressed price per lineal foot of pipe on (1) diameter of pipe; (2) lineal
feet of pipe purchased; (3) haul distance in miles; and (4) a dummy variable in
which observations in the competitive interlude (the last half of 1960) were
assigned a one and all other observations were assigned a zero. There were 259
observations; R 2 was 0.94. The coefficient of the dummy variable was negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level. It indicated an average surcharge of
$0.725 per lineal foot, or approximately 15.5% over the average price of $4.68 per
lineal foot. The jury awarded $150,000, which the court would have trebled and
added an award for attorney fees. It is not apparent how the jury reached this
figure. The case was subsequently settled for $475,000.
In his analysis, Parker used a "white sale" period of the last half of 1960 when
the conspiracy broke up due to the entry of a competitor into the market. This
period was more favorable to the plaintiffs as a comparison period than the pre-
1960 period would have been; at that time there was no conspiracy but also no
competitor and prices were almost as high as those of the conspiracy period. The
white sale period ended when the competitor was bought out. Thus, Parker's
method questionably attributed the spread between the preconspiracy and com-
petitive price levels to the conspiracy, whereas at least part of the spread may have
been attributable to an absence of competition in the market that was disadvanta-
geous to the plaintiff, but not illegal.18
C. Broiler Chickens
In In re Chicken Anlitrust Ltigatzon, 19 plaintiffs attacked the "recommended"
price and production program of an association of chicken processors selling ready-
to-cook chickens to retailers, wholesalers, and large volume consumers. The organ-
ization, known as the National Broiler Marketing Association (NBMA), was
formed in 1970 to counteract economic depression in the chicken-processing
industry; its members included about half the industry. In an earlier Department
of Justice lawsuit against the same defendants, the Department had elected to seek
only injunctive and not monetary relief because its experts had concluded that the
18. "If a firm has taken no action to destroy competition it may be unfair to deprive it of the ordinary
opportunity to set prices at a profit-maximizing level. Thus, no court has required a lawful monopolist to
forfeit to a purchaser three times the increment of its price over that which would prevail in a competitive
market." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), 63,485 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (opinion on fee applications).
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NBMA program had not appreciably affected broiler prices.20
Edward W. Erickson of North Carolina State University, with the assistance of
William Henry of Georgia State University, prepared an econometric analysis for
the plaintiffs to show the effect of the NBMA program. 2' The study was presented
in the proceeding on fee applications after the case was settled. The study, using
USDA data, analyzed the average monthly price of broilers in nine cities for the
192 months between 1960 and 1975, which included the twenty-seven month
period between January 1, 1971, and March 31, 1973, when the broiler chicken
producers conducted their joint economic program. These prices were regressed
on (1) the monthly average prices of beef, pork, and turkey; (2) dummy variables
for each quarter of the year (because the demand for broilers is seasonal); (3) the
consumer price index; (4) consumer disposable income (BLS data); and (5) the per
capita broiler production for each period, in pounds per person, as reported by the
USDA. The study included a dummy variable for "all other influences" which
took on value one in the conspiracy period (months 133 through 159) and zero
otherwise.
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the study showed a statistically significant nega-
tive coeffficient of $1.36 per pound for the dummy variable, indicating that prices
FIGURE 2
BROILER CHICKENS
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968
YE \R
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20. Id. at 76,562.
21. The description that follows used the economic report of E.W. Erickson & W. Henry, Economic
Analysis of Potential Damages (Oct. 1979) (unpublished report submitted to the court).
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for broilers in the price-fixing period were about 5% lower than would have been
expected on the basis of the supply and demand factors included in the regression
equation model. The fitted values from the estimated regression equation and the
actual prices are plotted in Figure 2.
The plaintiffs' experts suggested that this perverse result could be explained by
the fact that association members accounted for only about half the broiler produ-
cers, and by the possibility that association members had not adhered to the rec-
ommended prices and production levels. These reasons would explain a
statistically insignificant coefficient, but not a statistically significant negative one.
Another explanation tendered by the experts was that in July 1971 shortly
after publication of a book by Ralph Nader and Harrison Wellford charging lax-
ness in USDA meat inspection, there was a much-publicized PCB contamination
of broiler feed and broilers; the experts speculated that these two events may have
reduced demand for broilers during part of the price-fixing period. Excluding the
"PCB period" (August 1971-April 1972) from the time in which the dummy vari-
able was switched on, led to a new estimated coefficient value of 0.43C per pound,
which was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Since the coefficient was still
negative, however, the equation still provided no basis for damages.
To come up with a damage figure, the experts rather tentatively argued that
they were justified in considering only months in the price-fixing period with posi-
tive residuals, that is, when actual prices exceeded the predicted prices. No deduc-
tion was allowed for negative residual months on the theory that the fixing worked
only intermittently or was outweighed at times by other factors such as the PCB
scandal. To counter the argument that such months reflected simply chance vari-
ation, a separate calculation was made in which only those months were counted
in which actual prices exceeded predicted prices by more than one standard error.
This calculation yielded aggregate damages of $26 million. Defendants subse-
quently settled for $35 million.
The experts' ad hoc method of estimation was not defensible. By looking only
at the positive residuals, a "damage" figure can be generated in any period that is
long enough for random variation to generate residuals in excess of one standard
error on the positive side. The record contains no indication that the experts were
challenged. In its opinion on fee allowances, which followed the settlement, the
court referred to their estimate as "reasonable," but it sensibly added that the
damage figure was "still a matter of some speculation, despite the extensive testing
done by these two experts."'22 The court noted that recent decisions in the circuit
had indicated that statistical testing would not sustain the plaintiffs' burden of
proof on the issue of damages. It is unclear what was meant by this and the cited
cases do not clarify the point. 23 The court may have meant that since the regres-
sion estimates provide only an average overcharge with respect to all purchasers, it
would not be a sufficient basis for estimating damages with respect to any partic-
ular purchaser. If intended, this point would be incorrect, since a computation of
22. In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,485, at 76,562 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
23. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).
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average damages for a class has been accepted as an appropriate basis for indi-
vidual damage awards to class members.
24
D. Plywood
In In re Pl1wood Anitrust Litigatin,2 5 class actions were brought by plywood
purchasers against softwood plywood manufacturers. With respect to the three
defendants who stood trial-Georgia Pacific Corporation, Weyerhaeuser Com-
pany, and Willamete Industries-the jury found that they and all other manufac-
turers of southern plywood had engaged in a conspiracy from February 23, 1968,
to at least December 31, 1973, by which the prices of southern plywood were
inflated. The agreement was that purchasers would be charged "west coast
freight" (freight computed as though the product had been shipped from the west
coast), which exceeded actual freight charges from southern shipping points (the
excess being referred to as "phantom freight"), and would be charged on the basis
of "standard weights" to calculate freight even though these standard weights
exceeded the actual weights.
Defendants' expert, Peter Steiner from the University of Michigan, argued that
in the absence of an agreement to charge phantom freight, southern suppliers
would not have reduced their prices because there was sufficient demand for ply-
wood at the higher prices. To sustain that view, he introduced a regression study
of plywood prices by himself and a colleague, Daniel Rubinfeld from the Univer-
sity of Michigan, which was designed to show that the market was competitive
because prices responded to supply and demand factors. 26 In the study they
regressed the price of plywood (expressed in index form) on (1) housing starts by
region (a demand factor); (2) income (demand); (3) stumpage price (the price for
timber sold from private lands in Louisiana-a supply factor); (4) forest sales (the
price for timber sold from publicly owned land in Oregon and Washington); (5)
productive capacity of plywood plants (supply); (6) log drying costs (supply); and
(7) gluing costs (supply).
The parameters in the model were estimated from data for the period May
1964 through February 1977, which covered the time when the defendants used
the west coast freight rates. For that period it appeared to track actual prices quite
closely, which Steiner cited as evidence that the market was in fact competitive
because prices responded to normal supply and demand factors.
Plaintiffs did not introduce a competing statistical regression model, but rather
relied on judgmental expert testimony and cross-examination of the defendants'
expert. The jury found that the plaintiffs had been financially injured by the
amount of phantom freight and the excess of standard weights over actual weights.
24. See, e.g., In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 353-55 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,699 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
25. 376 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. La. 1974),affd, 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. granted sub. noa. Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 456 U.S. 971 (1982).
26. Transcript at 2912-42, 2962-65, 2982-3011 (Nov. 8, 1978), In re Plywood Antitrust Ltig. Details of
the study are given in Rubinfeld & Steiner, Quantitativte Aethods In Antitrus Litugaiton, LAW AND CONTrEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 69. The authors are indebted to Professors Rubinfeld and Steiner for making
their manuscript and data available to us.
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The court of appeals affirmed, 27 and the Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari. 28 Before the case could be heard, however, the parties settled with
defendants' payment of $165 million. 29
The model proposed by Steiner does not persuasively support his conclusion.
The fact that prices responded to supply and demand factors does not preclude the
possibility that they included a component-like phantom freight-that drove the
entire level up. Indeed most price equations include both supply and demand
factors and a dummy variable for the conspiracy on just the assumption that both
may affect price. Moreover, the model did not appear to account very well for
turning points even during the fit period and, more significantly, it failed to
account for a sharp upward spike in prices that occurred in the postphantom-
freight period of 1977-78. For most of that period, it perversely projected
phantom-freight prices that were sharply below actual prices. The projected and
actual prices for the phantom-freight and postphantom-freight periods are shown
in Figure 3 below.
This brief summary of cases suggests that regression models frequently will not
FIGURE 3
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27. In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. granted sub. nor. Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Lyman Lamb Co., 456 U.S. 971 (1982).
28. Id
29. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 19, 1983, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
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predict price variations with sufficient accuracy to enable an economist to estimate
reliably the relative small effects of a conspiracy. This article has touched on a few
of the problems in some of the cases, but in most cases there was no very detailed
exploration of the issues raised by the models. Probably the most detailed dissec-
tion of a model took place in the second Corrugated Contazner trial when the econo-
mists confronted each other. The following discussion looks in greater detail at
some of the main issues that are likely to arise when models are introduced,
drawing principally on the Corrugated Container case, and to a lesser extent on other
price-fixing cases. We will also refer to models presented in antidiscrimination
class action litigation, because some of the problems are similar and there has been
more experience with multiple regression studies in that context than there has
been in the price-fixing cases.30
II
ISSUES IN MODEL BUILDING
A. Types of Models
The models used in most of the cases consist of a regression equation in which
price movement is, in large part, accounted for by certain explanatory factors
included in the equation. Price is said to be regressed on these factors, which are
its regressors. Typically there are both supply and demand factors in the equation.
It is not assumed that the explanatory factors account perfectly for all movements
of price, but only that they represent the principal influences so that the regression
equation gives the average price. Variations about this average are assumed to be
the result of many small accidental forces so that the discrepancies between the
actual and regression estimates of average price have a random character. These
discrepancies are known as errors when measured with respect to the "true" regres-
sion equation, and as residuals when measured with respect to the equation esti-
mated from a sample of data. The randomness of the errors is defined in a precise
technical sense that is described later in this article.
When the model is correct, the estimates of the coefficients of the explanatory
variables and of the price are unbiased and consistent. Roughly speaking, a
method of estimation is unbiased if the average of the estimates over repeated
samples is the true value of the parameter being estimated. A method of estima-
tion is consistent if the estimates it generates converge to the true value of the
parameter as the sample size increases.
The models used in the cases previously discussed may be divided into two
types. In what is known as a "dummy variable" model, the equation is estimated
from data covering both conspiratorial and competitive periods and the explana-
tory factors include a dummy variable to account for the effect of the conspiracy.
The dummy variable takes on a value of one for observations in the collusion
period and zero otherwise (or vice versa). In a linear equation, the coefficient of the
conspiracy dummy variable is the average overcharge due to the conspiracy in the
30. For a discussion of some of the earlier antidiscrimination class actions, see Finkelstein, The Judicial
Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980).
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same units in which price is expressed. Plaintiffs' experts in the Chicken Antitrust
case presented such a model. If price is expressed in natural logarithms, as it fre-
quently is, the coefficient (if not too large, for example, less than 0.25) closely
approximates (when multiplied by 100) the percentage overcharge. 3 1 The coeffi-
cient form of equation is the one used in most employment discrimination litiga-
tion, where one or more dummy variables may be included for sex and race and
the size of the coefficients measures the extent to which the minority group or
women have been underpaid relative to Caucasian men.
A dummy variable model assumes that the conspiracy added a certain dollar
or percentage amount to price during the conspiracy period and nothing in the
competitive period. In fact, the conspiracy might have raised prices in a more
complex and varying fashion. The investigator may wish to make no assumption
about the effect of the conspiracy, but rather treat it as an unspecified influence
that is not explained by the model. In such a case, the determinants of price are
the supply and demand factors dictated by economic theory and the effect of the
conspiracy is appraised by looking at the differences between the actual and pre-
dicted prices, that is, the residuals. For this reason an equation in this form is
referred to here as a "residuals model."
Residuals models can be estimated in several ways. One approach is to use
data from both conspiracy and competitive periods and to compare the average
residual in the two periods. This method can be used to test the null hypothesis
that the conspiracy had no effect, but it is not useful to estimate the extent of any
overcharge. To use a residuals model for that latter purpose, it should be esti-
mated from data for the conspiracy or competitive periods and the resulting equa-
tion should then be used to project what the price would have been in the other
period. It is probably preferable to estimate the model from competitive period
data and use it to project competitive prices in the conspiracy period, because this
approach leads more directly to an estimate of competitive prices in the conspiracy
period and the usual supply and demand factors included in the equation are
more convincingly relevant in a competitive market. 32 Both these methods were
used in the Corrugated Container litigation.3 3 In the Concrete Pipe litigation, plaintiff
used a dummy variable model, while defendant used a residuals model.
Which type of model should be preferred? In answering this question it should
be noted that the dummy variable and residuals models usually give different
measures of the effect of a conspiracy. The reason is that when the conspiracy
dummy variable is correlated with other explanatory factors (as it usually will be)
31. More precisely, if a is the coefficient of the conspiracy variable, the overcharge as a proportion of
the competitive price is ea-l, where e is the base of natural logarithms.
32. If separate supply and demand structural equations are being estimated, competitive period data
should be used because the assumption that the price is represented by the intersection of the supply and
demand curves holds only in a competitive market. See unzfa p. 163. A reduced form equation with both
supply and demand factors could be estimated from noncompetitive period data because the conspirators
would still look to supply and demand factors in setting price in order to maximize their profit. Fisher,
supra note 4, at 727-28. If, however, the conspirators do not act with total success to maximize profits (and
in most cases they would not) it is unclear what the proper reduced form equation would be.
33. Defendants' expert also computed a dummy variable model which showed a very small but statis-
tically significant overcharge. Transcript at 479-82 (Feb. 8, 1983).
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the least-squares regression method will allocate some explanatory weight to each
factor; no factor or group of factors is preferred. By contrast, in the residuals
model, price movement is first attributed to the supply and demand explanatory
factors, and it is only the unexplained residual variation that is assigned to the
conspiracy. In effect, the residuals model asks whether the data are consistent with
an assumption that the conspiracy had no effect. 34
From this difference one might fairly argue that the effect of the conspiracy
should be measured by the dummy variable model, since it is not tilted against a
finding of a conspiracy effect, but rather is neutral as between the conspiracy and
other factors. The argument for a neutral method would be strengthened in cases
in which there was evidence apart from the conspiracy itself that it had been effec-
tive. Of course, defendants may not complain if plaintiffs use a residuals model-
as they did in the Corrugated Coniairner litigation-because it is less favorable to their
case. Nevertheless, the court in at least one employment discrimination case
accepted a residuals model introduced by defendants, despite plaintiffs' argument
that it was biased against a finding of discrimination. 35
B. The Choice of Explanatory Variables
The models already examined have displayed a high correlation between pro-
jected and actual prices over the period used to fit the equation. This goodness-of-
fit was generally cited by the experts as evidence that the models were correct.
However, a high correlation in the fit period does not prove that the explanatory
factors are in fact good predictors. 36 Nor does the fact that the projection is good
when prices are smoothly trending justify a conclusion that the model will accu-
rately predict a break in the trend. In time series models it is not uncommon to
find multiple correlation coefficients exceeding 0.9 in equations that perform badly
at turning points in a price trend.37 Moreover, the expert may have adopted the
practice of "trying out" different sets of explanatory factors drawn from a large
number of candidates to find the best fit. When this is done, the multiple correla-
tion coefficient usually declines markedly in a new data set.
Sometimes defects in the explanatory variables are fairly obvious. One such
case occurs when coefficients have the wrong signs. Such misspecification is not
uncommon. A costs variable with a negative sign indicates a misspecified equation
because it implies that prices would go down as costs go up. However, a perverse
34. Suppose that a residuals model is estimated from all the data (from the conspiratorial and com-
petitive periods combined), and the statistical significance of the conspiracy appraised by comparing the
average residuals in the conspiracy and competitive periods. It can be shown that the difference in average
residuals equals the conspiracy coefficient times one minus the squared multiple correlation coefficient of
the conspiracy dummy variable with the other explanatory factors in the price equation. Thus, as con-
spiracy becomes more and more confounded (correlated) with other factors, the difference in average
residuals becomes smaller relative to the conspiracy coefficient.
35. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 154, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
36. When a lagged dependent variable is used as an explanatory variable, the equation is fitted by
using the initial actual value of the lagged dependent variable and its subsequent estimated values. This
corresponds the fitting technique to the way the equation is subsequently used to make projections. If the
explanatory factors are weak predictors, however, the equation may "walk away" from the data, even
during the fit period, so that a close correlation in the fit period is better evidence in favor of the equation.
37. For an example from administrative law, see Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 1455-62.
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sign is not evidence of a misspecified equation if it is not statistically significant
(and a zero coefficient would not be perverse), or if the explanatory variable is part
of a group of variables that have a high mutual correlation and the sign for the
combined group is correct. 38
But even when all coefficients have the correct sign, the equation cannot be
assumed to be correct; its reliability must be tested by using it to make projections
on another sample of data. In the Corrugated Container case, Fisher performed such
a test by reversing Beyer's procedure. He estimated Beyer's model from data for
the competitive period and then used the model to project what the competitive
price would have been in the collusive period. 39 The projected competitive prices
were far above the actual collusive prices-a result indicating that the explanatory
factors were not in fact good predictors of price movement.
In the Chicken Antitrust litigation, the model itself showed perverse results when
it projected competitive prices for the collusive period that were higher than the
actual collusive prices.40 The same indication of inadequacy appears in the P1ly-
wood Antitrust model, which underpredicts the rise in prices that occurred after the
ending of the conspiracy.4 '
A similar but more subtle problem arises when the model is not obviously miss-
pecified. Most explanatory variables are proxies-and sometimes rather crude
proxies-for the true quantities of interest. Data for industry-wide costs may only
roughly approximate the relevant costs for a group of conspiring producers; a gen-
eral price index may not reflect the true inflation for a particular industry. In the
best of all econometric worlds the proxies are unbiased estimators of the true fac-
tors and are highly correlated with them. But even when this is true, the fact that
the proxies are imperfect will bias the model's estimates of the conspiracy's effect.
This has been called underadjustment bias because the proxies do not fully adjust
for the factors they are supposed to represent.
The direction of bias depends on the situation. If the proxies indicate that
prices in the postconspiracy period would have been higher than in the conspiracy
period (due to an increase in real costs, for example), the projected conspiratorial
prices in the postconspiracy period would be lower than they would have been if
the proxies had been perfect, and the effect of the conspiracy would be under-
stated. On the other hand, if the proxies indicate that prices in the postconspiracy
period would have been lower than in the conspiracy period (due to a weakening
38. For example, in the plywood model, the coefficients of the variables for cost of logs and cost of
gluing were negative and statistically significant and thus perverse. Cost of drying, however, had a much
larger positive coefficient, and all three cost elements were highly correlated. When the regression was
recomputed with the three combined, the coefficient for the combined variable was positive. The fact that
the regression was computed with them separately would not generally affect the validity of the estimates
of the dependent variable.
39. Fisher's "backcast" was made by projecting competitive prices forward from January 1963. For
the lagged price variable, the December 1962 price was used, and -each subsequent lagged price was the
previously projected price, not the actual price. One might object that the initial price was not securely
competitive, but the effect of the starting point wears off quickly so that it becomes essentially irrelevant
within a year.
40. See supra pp. 151-52.
41. See supra p. 154.
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in demand, for example), the regression would understate the drop in prices and
the effect of the conspiracy would be overstated.
When different proxies point in different directions, the direction of bias
cannot be determined. The reason is that the net effect depends on the degree of
bias attributable to each of the proxies, and the degree of bias is a function of the
correlation between the proxy and the true explanatory factor. 42 But since this
correlation is unobservable, the bias cannot be estimated. The problem of under-
adjustment bias was recently recognized by Judge Goettel in the Sobel case as a
reason for denying relief to a class of women, even though plaintiffs' multiple
regression model included a statistically significant sex coefficient that apart from
bias would have indicated discrimination against women. 43
The potential for bias from underadjustment is a problem for which there is at
present no good solution. Whether the problem is serious in the context of price
time series is unknown.
C. Lagged Dependent Variables
One type of explanatory variable deserves separate discussion because its use
raises special problems. In an econometric model it is not uncommon to find that
the dependent variable itself, lagged by a time period, has been included as an
explanatory factor. The justification is that (1) the lagged variable picks up other
influences on price not specified by the regression equation; or (2) the lagged vari-
able reflects price "stickiness," that is, the slowness with which price responds to
changes in explanatory factors. In the Corrugated Container case, Beyer justified the
use of price the previous month as an explanatory variable by the fact that some
prices were determined by annual contracts and thus could not respond immedi-
ately to changes in costs and other explanatory factors.44 He did not explain how
this would justify the one-month lag that he used.
One difficulty with a lagged dependent variable is that, if the lag is short, that
variable will tend to dominate the equation if its coefficient is estimated from
smoothly trending data so that the equation becomes a poor predictor of changes
in trend. These problems were evident in the Corrugated Container models used by
Beyer in both trials. In those models, the dominant explanatory factor was lagged
price; no other factor approached it in importance or statistical significance. The
result was that the model tended simply to project smooth trends from wherever
the fit period was ended. Fisher demonstrated this by showing that the model
would have projected collusive prices below the competitive prices in the postcon-
spiracy period if the fit period had simply stopped at the end of 1971 instead of the
42. The effect may be quantified more precisely as follows: If the conspiracy had no effect, the coeffi-
cient of a dummy variable for conspiracy in the regression equation (the expected value of which should be
zero) would be equal to the difference in average price in the conspiracy and competitive periods times one
minus the squared correlation coefficient between the proxy and the true explanatory factor. If the proxy
were perfect, the correlation would be one and the conspiracy coefficient would be zero. Conversely, if the
proxy were wholly ineffective, the correlation would be zero and the conspiracy coefficient would simply be
equal to the difference in average prices. See Robbins & Levin, A ,Vote on the "Underadjusiment Phenomenon'" I
STATISTICS & PROBABILITY LETTERS 137-39 (1983).
43. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 154, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
44. Transcript at 87 (Dec. 15, 1982).
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end of 1974. 45
One technique for reducing the overprediction of trend is to enlarge the
interval between successive price observations. If quarterly instead of monthly
prices are used in the Corrugated Container data from the first trial, the dominance of
the lagged price is reduced and the coefficients of the other explanatory factors are
increased in relative importance. However, the estimates of conspiracy effect do
not change very much.
Another technique for avoiding an overprediction of trend is a first-difference
equation. In such an equation, the dependent variable is the difference in price
between two successive periods, and this change in price is regressed on changes in
the explanatory factors. 46 In effect, this transformation allows changes in the
explanatory factors to account for departures from pure linear trend in the data.
When such an equation is estimated from the Corrugated Contatner data in the first
trial, the fit of the equation declines from a squared multiple correlation coefficient
of 0.99 (which primarily reflects trend) to 0.33, and the estimated average over-
charge declines from 7.8% to 4.3%.47
Besides overprediction of trend, use of a lagged dependent variable creates the
risk of another potential distortion. The most common problem in a time series
regression model is serial correlation in the error term; this means that the errors in
successive observations are not independent as specified by the theoretical model,48
but are correlated to some degree. In an equation that does not have a lagged
dependent variable, the only consequence of such correlation is to make the usual
calculations of standard errors unreliable and the true precision of the equation
lower than that indicated by theory. However, tests of statistical significance,
which use standard errors, will not be important in most cases and so this defect in
and of itself may not be crucial. But, if there is serial correlation of the errors in an
equation that includes a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory factor, the
resulting estimates of the coefficients of the explanatory variables will become
biased and inconsistent in a way that cannot be predicted. 49 This defect goes to
the heart of the acceptability of the equation estimates.
A solution to this problem is difficult to achieve. It requires either new explan-
atory variables that more completely capture the systematic relationships so that
what remains for the error term is truely random noise, or various rather complex
techniques for estimating the correlation structure of the error term and the esti-
mation of a new equation that takes explicit account of such correlation. 50
45. Defendants' Exhibit No. 1352, Transcript at 426 (Feb. 8, 1983), Corrugated Container.
46. In his first Corrugated Container model, Dr. Beyer inexplicably used change in cost as an explanatory
factor while entering all other variables in their original form. This inconsistency was corrected in the
second trial.
47. In making these illustrative computations, the period 1963-75 was used to fit the equation and the
forecast was made for the period 1977-79.
48. See infra pp. 164-65.
49. J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 211-16 (1963).
50. For a discussion see M.D. INTRILIGATOR, ECONOMETRIC MODELS, TECHNIQUES & APPLICA-
TIONS 159-65 (1978).
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D. Tainted Variables
Some explanatory factors may themselves have been influenced by collusion.
In the Ohio Valley case, the court found that during the period of collusion defend-
ants did not have to face a competitive market and consequently made less of an
effort to control costs. 5' To the extent costs are inflated as a by-product of collu-
sive behavior, inclusion of a cost variable to explain price would conceal the full
effect of the collusion. While such concealment is an issue to watch, it should not
be assumed that all cost data are tainted. A similar objection was made to the cost
data in the Plywood Antitrust case, but it seems unlikely that plywood gluing or
drying costs were inflated as a result of phantom freight or standardized weights.
The problem of tainted explanatory factors has arisen in much sharper form in
antidiscrimination litigation when, for example, the courts have divided over
whether it is proper to include academic rank as an explanatory factor in regres-
sion models of faculty salary at academic institutions.
52
E. Collusive and Competitive Periods
The results of a multiple regression study will generally be significantly influ-
enced by the choice of the collusive and competitive periods. The principal issues
have centered on the length of the collusive period and the existence of a transition
to full competition.
The regression coefficients of the explanatory variables represent averages over
the period used to fit the equation. When this period is long, the estimate of the
conspiracy coefficient is open to the objection that, being an average, it does not
fairly represent the period immediately adjacent to the competitive period used for
comparison. The regressions in both Corrugated Container cases were fitted over a
long period, which raised a question whether the result would have been different
if the regression had been calculated using a shorter period adjacent to the com-
petitive period. Fisher computed regressions for subperiods within the collusive
period and concluded (not surprisingly) that the regressions had significantly dif-
ferent coefficients, thus indicating that the relationships did change over time.
53
A period of collusive activity can be compared with (1) a competitive period
prior to the beginning of such activity; (2) a "white sale" period within the collu-
sive period' or (3) a period after the termination of the conspiracy. Each has its
difficulties. The preconspiracy period requires a determination of when the con-
51. Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914.(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
52. Compare Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 154, 166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (use
of rank approved) with Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (use of rank
disapproved). For a discussion, see Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 738-42.
53. Transcript at 429-31 (Feb. 8, 1983), Corrugated Container. The method used by Fisher (sometimes
referred to as the Chow test) is one commonly used to determine whether there is a statistically significant
difference between the coefficients of two linear regressions. The test involves a comparison of the sum of
the squared residuals for the two regressions with the sum of the squared residuals for a new regression
computed from the pooled data for the two regressions. If the latter is much larger than the former, the
hypothesis that the two regressions have identical coefficients is rejected. See J. JOHNSTON, supra note 49, at
136-38. The finding of a statistically significant difference by means of the Chow test is subject to the
caveat discussed bifra p. 162. Contrary to the intimation in the second Corrugated Container trial, the Chow
test is not the only method for exploring this question in a time-series context.
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spiracy began, which is likely to be in doubt. The white sale period may involve
special conditions that did not persist throughout the period of collusive activities.
(This difficulty was present in the Concrete Pipe litigation where the white sale
occurred when a competitive firm entered the market and ended when it was
bought out.) More commonly used is the postconspiracy period, since the ending
of the conspiracy is usually a fairly dramatic event. In most cases, however, it is
argued that there is a transition period in which prices are still affected by the
residue of the conspiratorial activities. Whether there is such a transition is a sensi-
tive issue because the allowance of a period of one or two years between the ending
of collusion and the beginning of competition will probably change the estimated
effects of the collusion considerably, and increase greatly the uncertainty of the
econometric projections-which characteristically have a very short reliability life.
One technique for determining whether there is a transition period is to com-
pute separate regressions for successive time periods (for example, successive years)
after the termination of the conspiracy. A shift in the coefficients of the regressions
as the period of collusion recedes is evidence of a transition, which comes to an end
when the coefficients stabilize in the postconspiracy period. Fisher tested the
alleged transition period 1975-78 in the second Corrugated Container case and found
no statistically significant difference between the regression coefficients in this
period and in the later period; he relied on this finding to reject Beyer's assertion
that there was a transition. 54
If a statistically significant difference is demonstrated, the existence of a transi-
tion period may still be in doubt for various reasons. One statistical reason is that
the degree of significance may be overstated. The power of the statistical test to
detect a significant difference depends on the number of independent observations
used in fitting the regression. If the regression model is misspecified so that the
errors are not in fact independent but are correlated, the number of independent
residuals will be to some extent smaller than their actual number, and thus
findings of statistical significance based on the number of residuals will overstate
statistical significance. It is thus easier to disprove the existence of a transition
period econometrically than it is to confirm one.
F. Extrapolation
Projection by multiple regression is most reliable when the values of the
explanatory factors used for the projection are near the averages for those variables
in the data used to fit the equation. As these values depart from their averages, the
standard errors of the predicted value increases (although the standard errors of
the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables do not). More significantly,
when regression estimates are based on values of explanatory factors that lie near
or beyond the range of the data on which the equation is estimated, it becomes
problematical whether the estimated regression relationships will continue to hold
in the new range. In the Corrugated Container cases, the price of containers in the
competitive period was much higher than in the collusive period and defendants
argued that the demand for corrugated containers declined as users sought other
54. Transcript at 434 (Feb. 8, 1983), Corrugated Container.
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packaging; the weakening of demand, not the ending of the conspiracy, explained
the flattening of price. 55 Cognate problems of extrapolation are likely to arise in
most antitrust contexts because the price levels in periods separated by years may
differ considerably, even after adjustment for inflation.
G. Structural Equations and Reverse Relationships
A single equation in which price is the dependent variable and supply and
demand elements are the explanatory factors is what is known as the "reduced
form" of a supply equation and a demand equation. In the separate supply and
demand equations, quantity is the dependent variable. Price appears in both as
an explanatory factor but otherwise the explanatory factors are different. A tech-
nically correct method of estimating the coefficients for price is to solve the two
equations for quantity simultaneously using special methods of estimation such as
two-stage least squares. 56
As we have seen, in most cases the parties have not estimated the separate
structural equations but contented themselves with the reduced form that com-
bines both supply and demand factors in a single equation. Although this practice
is not objectionable per se, it may be desirable also to estimate the supply and
demand equations separately. The structural equations disclose the relationships
that are concealed by the reduced form, which is essentially a black box; showing
them separately may reveal defects in the model. In the data used in the first
Corrugated Container case, the demand equation when estimated separately had an
upward slope, a perverse result indicating a misspecification of the model.5 7 This
defect was not disclosed because the separate structural equations had not been
estimated by either party. The same defect did not appear in the equations used
in the second trial.
Estimation of multiple equations becomes necessary if explanatory variables, in
addition to influencing the dependent variable, are also influenced by it. When
such simultaneous reverse relationships exist, the estimates of the coefficients gen-
erated by ordinary least-squares regression become biased and inconsistent. 58
A point about a possible reverse relationship was made in the second Corrugated
Container case. Defendants argued that the 26% overcharge was patently ridicu-
lous because a price drop of 26% would have put defendants out of business. Beyer
responded that in that event linerboard prices would also have dropped, thus
reducing costs. 59 This was a concession of a large reverse influence of price on cost.
The same problem arose with respect to the inventory variable, since price was
likely to influence inventory as well as inventory influencing price. While these are
potent theoretical points, it cannot be assumed that a multistage least-squares
approach would produce very different results from ordinary least squares applied
to a reduced form equation. The effect of any such difference should be
demonstrated.
55. Transcript at 185-93 (Feb. 8, 1983).
56. For a discussion, see R. WONNACOTr & T. WONNACOTr, ECONOMETRICS 172-95 (1970).
57. Conversation with John E. Linville, one of the counsel in the case (June 22, 1983)..
58. M.D. INTRILIGATOR, supra note 50, at 389.
59. Transcript at 21-33 (Dec. 16, 1982).
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H. Standard Error Computations
In the Concrete Pipe and the Chicken Antitrust cases, as previously discussed, par-
ties based arguments on the computed values of the standard errors of the regres-
sion coefficients. 60 In theory, these standard errors reflect the variation in the
regression estimates that would occur if the same regression model were computed
from other samples of data generated by the same process. If the average price in
the postconspiracy period, for example, lies within two standard deviations of the
average predicted values based on the regression equation, most statisticians would
decline to say that there was a significant difference between the two. When a
conspiracy coefficient model is estimated, a coefficient of the conspiracy dummy
variable that is not significantly different from zero indicates that the hypothesis of
no effect cannot be rejected. It is not, however, justifiable to argue, as defendants
did in the Concrete Pipe litigation, that damages are properly measured by the dif-
ference between actual prices and the upper (or lower) limit of a 95% confidence
interval around the regression estimate. If the model is correct, the best price esti-
mate is the regression estimate and there is no justification for picking another
figure with a much lower probability of being correct.
Arguments based on standard errors depend on the theoretical correctness of
the calculations, which in turn depend on whether the regression model meets
certain specifications. Most models based on time series do not meet those specifi-
cations and consequently standard error calculations are, at best, almost always
suspect. In general, the true variability of the equation is greater than that indi-
cated by theoretical calculation. Therefore, a statistically insignificant difference
between a "projected" competitive and actual conspiratorial price should usually
be accepted as evidence that the conspiracy had no measurable impact on price,
but the appearance of a difference that is statistically significant should be the
occasion for an investigation of the correctness of the model.
The basic requirement of the multiple regression model is that the explanatory
factors reflect all major forces bearing on price so that departures from the regres-
sion estimate (that is, the errors) are the result of many relatively small influences.
This requirement is assumed to give the errors a random character defined by four
properties. First, if repeated estimates are made of price, the average of the esti-
mates for any given set of values of the explanatory factors will be equal to the true
price, which is another way of saying that the errors sum to zero. In that case the
equation is said to be unbiased. Second, the errors are normally distributed about
the regression estimate. Third, the variance of the normally distributed errors is
constant for all values of price. Fourth, there is no correlation between the erfors
associated with two different observations of price, so that, for example, an actual
price above the regression estimate in one month reveals nothing about whether it
will also be above the estimate in another month. Since the errors are unobserv-
able (because the "true" regression relationship is unknown), these properties
cannot be directly observed. Instead, the tests must be made on the residuals,
which are the differences between the actual prices and their regression
60. See supra pp. 149-50, 152.
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estimates.61
In a regression model of time series data, the most important question to
resolve is whether there is serial correlation in the errors; the existence of such
correlation frequently is a warning that the model is of the wrong form or that
some important explanatory factor has been omitted. The Durbin-Watson test is
commonly used to test for such first order serial correlation. 62 In the Broiler Chicken
regression, the experts did not mention the fact that the Durbin-Watson test sug-
gested serial correlation of the errors, indicating that the model was misspecified.
An even more important diagnostic tool, but one that is frequently ignored, is a
plot of the residuals. Standard computer packages facilitate this by generating
plots in which the residuals are plotted against the fitted values of the dependent
variable or against values of the explanatory factors. From such plots it is rela-
tively easy to spot patterns that suggest the linear model does not fit the data or
outlying observations that should be separately investigated. A full justification of
a model should include an account of an inspection of such residual plots. 63
A second important question in time series modeling is whether the variance of
the error is constant. This condition will be violated if the entire scale of the equa-
tion increases with time, in which case the variance of the error will also increase.
The use of undeflated dollars in a period of high inflation can create this defect.
6 4
To detect departures from a constant variance, the investigator should inspect
plots of the residuals to see if they "fan out" along the time line.
Where the errors may not conform to the model, there are alternative ways of
proceeding. Probably the best way is to make a direct assessment of variability by
computing regressions for subperiods and observing the variation in the estimates.
When this is done for the Corrugated Container data from the first trial, the results
show much greater variation in the regression estimates than that indicated by the
standard errors.65
I. Time-Series Analysis
The difficulty of constructing econometric models that satisfy theoretical
requirements suggests that one might use more general methods that do not
61. The characteristics of the residuals are not identical to those of the errors. For example, least-
squares estimation insures that the algebraic sum of the residuals is always zero, but this in general is not
true of the errors in a given sample of data. However, diagnostic tests of the residuals have been devised
that shed light on the properties of the errors. See D.A. BELSLEY, E.KuH & R.E. WELSCH, REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS (1980).
62. For a discussion, see M.D. INTRILIGATOR,supra note 50, at 159-65. If a lagged dependent variable
is included as an explanatory factor, the Durbin-Watson test will tend to show no serial correlation and a
different method must be substituted for a correct picture. Id at 164 n.22.
63. See, e.g., S. CHATTERJEE & B. PRICE, REGRESSION ANALYSIS By EXAMPLE (1977).
64. A nontime series example is the following: a regression of total costs on number of transactions for
a large number of New York Stock Exchange firms was used to determine whether there were economies of
scale in the brokerage industry. However, the standard error of the coefficient of number of transactions
was found to be unreliable because the scale of the entire equation, and with it the variance of error term,
grew with the size of the firms. Very different results were obtained when the average cost per transaction
was substituted as the dependent variable. Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 1463-66.
65. The authors' subperiod tests of the regression model during the conspiracy period showed that the
difference between the predicted and actual values as a percentage of predicted values ranged up to 6.06%
in the fourth year after the fit.
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assume that the explanatory variables included in the equation have accounted for
everything except random error. This point of view leads to various methods of
time series analysis that have found widespread applications in recent years. The
so-called Box-Jenkins methods are among the most popular and successful of these
techniques. 66
Although the estimation of parameters in time series models is a highly tech-
nical matter and one that is computationally complex, the basic ideas of the Box-
Jenkins approach are not hard to understand. Consider a time series in which the
observations (prices, for example) fluctuate about a mean or expected value with a
constant variance. Such a series has no trend and is said to be a stationary linear
process. Fluctuations of price are caused by independent random influences or
"shocks." The shocks are assumed to have some continuing impact that dimin-
ishes over time, so that price at any given time reflects the sum of all prior shocks,
with the weights usually diminishing (except for seasonality effects) as one moves
back in time. Unlike a regression model, which assumes that departures from the
regression mean are uncorrelated errors, the linear process for time series described
here allows for correlated displacements from the mean in successive observations,
the extent of correlation depending on the persistence of the effect of prior shocks.
The more persistent those influences are, the greater the correlation between suc-
cessive observations.
There are three representations of the general linear process that are of prac-
tical interest. One is called an autoregressive model, in which current price is
expressed as the weighted sum of a finite number of prior prices plus a random
shock. The name derives from the fact that the model bears a resemblance to a
regression model in which a dependent variable is regressed on independent vari-
ables plus an error term. Since price is regressed on prior values of itself, the pro-
cess is said to be autoregressive. A second type is a moving-average model, in
which price is expressed as the weighted sum of a finite number of prior shocks.
Although the separate shocks are not directly observable because fluctuations of
price reflect the combhned influence of past shocks, there are methods for estimating
the parameters and the shocks. A third type of model combines both autoregres-
sive and moving-average terms in a single equation. The combined approach is
frequently used because its flexibility minimizes the number of terms that are
needed to express the model.
Since most time series encountered in practice are not stationary, trend must
be eliminated from the data before the model can be estimated. This is done by
taking first differences, for example, using the differences in price between succes-
sive months as the data instead of the values for each month. If first differences
still show trend, the data are differenced a second time.
In estimating the model, an investigator must make judgments about the
number of autoregressive and moving-average terms to include. There is consider-
66. See G.E.P. Box & G.M. JENKINS, TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS, FORECASTING AND CONTROL (1970)
for a detailed technical explication of the method. For an introductory discussion, see J.P. CLEARY & H.
LEVENBACH, THE PROFESSIONAL FORECASTER (1982). See also M.G. KENDALL, TIME SERIES (2d ed.
1976). More accessible to the nonspecialist is C. CHATFIELD, THE ANALYSIS OF TIME SERIES (2d ed.
1980).
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able latitude here and different choices may lead to widely different results. The
weights assigned to the autoregressive and moving-average terms are determined
by a nonlinear estimation procedure that minimizes the sum of squared differences
between the model projections and the data on which they are based. Although
the calculations are complex, computer programs to perform them are readily
available to the practitioner. Time series methods have not, to the authors' knowl-
edge, appeared in a litigated case, although they have been used in at least one
academic study of overcharges due to price fixing.67
A modest use of time series methods is to regard them as complementary to
econometric methods. If the errors in a regression model are serially correlated, a
time series projection of the residuals, when added to the econometric projection, is
likely to produce better forecasts than those generated by the regression model
alone, which assumes that future residuals will have an expected value of zero.
When this hybrid technique is applied to the data of the first Corrugated Container
case, the projected overcharge drops from 7.8% to about 4%. The hybrid and
regression projections are shown in Figure 4 below. The closer fit of this hybrid
FIGURE 4
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67. A time series study of prices in the titanium industry indicated an overcharge of about 1.5%, or $8
million, during a period of collusion from 1970-76, for which the United States brought suit in United
States v. RMI Co., Civ. A. No. 78-1108E (W.D. Pa. filed Sept. 28, 1978) and United States v. RMI Co.,
Civ. A. No. 81-4177 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See Duggan & Narasimham, Pr'ce Fting In The Titanium Industy. A
Time Serns Anaysis, in Proceedings, Business and Economic Section, (American Statistical Assoc., 1981).
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model to actual prices in the postconspiracy period indicates that part of the over-
charge projected by the econometric model was due to its failure to account for the
correlation structure of the residuals.
A more aggressive use of time series models would involve their substitution for
econometric techniques. As applied to the Corrugated Container data, the pure time
series approach produces a straight-line projection that is closer to the actual
prices than the econometric projection until 1978, but it then becomes increasingly
irrelevant as it does not reflect the sharp subsequent upward turn in prices. Which
type of estimate is generally superior in the short run has been much debated, and
as one would expect there is no clear verdict. 68 In the absence of a consensus,
advocates of time series analysis argue that their methods should be preferred
because of simplicity and directness. Some econometricians reply that pure time
series methods are unuseable because they "explain" nothing.
III
CONCLUSIONS
The nascent excursion of the courts into econometrics suggests two perhaps
conflicting observations. The first is the remarkable fact that the judicial system is
presiding over the payment (mostly by settlement) of large sums as damages when
the econometric evidence of injury is equivocal at best. In Chicken Anttrust there
was no credible evidence of an overcharge and the settlement exclusive of lawyers'
fees was $30 million. In Plywood Antitrust the case was settled for $160 million and
there was no econometric proof of injury. In the Corrugated Contaiher cases the set-
tlements were in excess of $300 million but one jury ultimately found the proof of
overcharge unconvincing as to certain large purchasers. Confronted with this
record, one is tempted to say that the class action device has loaded things too
heavily against the defendants, by making it too risky for them to stand trial.
On the other hand, the introduction of econometric methods may have tilted
things too far against the plaintiffs when there is a trial. In the Ohio Valley case, the
plaintiff proved the overcharge by showing the difference in discount in the con-
spiracy and competitive periods; that showing sufficed for a prima facie case. It
was up to the defendants to prove-if they could-that the difference was due to
factors other than the conspiracy. If plaintiffs must now produce an econometric
model that accounts for the other factors and isolates the effect of a conspiracy,
they will have shouldered an entirely new burden. Given the great difficulties of
constructing plausible models, such a burden seems unfair, particularly if there is
independent evidence that the conspiracy has had some effect.
This does not mean that a simple-minded comparison of preconspiracy and
postconspiracy prices or profits should be sufficient for a prima facie case. Some
adjusting factors should be required but not necessarily a full-blown model. A
similar type of intermediate approach seems to be emerging in the employment
discrimination cases, where the courts expressly have accepted the pragmatic
68. Armstrong, Forecasting with Econometric Methods: Folklore Versus Fact, 51 J. Bus. 549 (1978).
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notion that a multiple regression study may be sufficient for a prima facie case
even if it reflects only some of the factors that plausibly may account for variations
in productivity. The parallel in the antitrust context discussed here would be to
require only the most basic of adjusting factors in an econometric equation, or
even to adopt a pure time series approach. If such a measure shows there was
damage, the amount may be treated as determined by a "just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approximate. '69 A full-fledged model would
be required only to rebut an inference that would otherwise be drawn from a
simple change in price level associated with the beginning or ending of a
conspiracy.
How this would work in practice should depend on the context. In the situa-
tion that is most persuasive for the plaintiffs, a smoothly trending price series suf-
fers an interruption of trend at the juncture between conspiratorial and
competitive periods. Such an interruption was evident in Corrugated Container.
Assuming that the interruption of trend is consistent with a drop in prices fol-
lowing the shift from conspiracy to competition, plaintiffs' prima facie case should
be made by a reasonable projection of prices with the dollars deflated by an appro-
priate index to account for inflation. The degree of sophistication required at that
point might depend on the nonstatistical evidence of the strength of the con-
spiracy. If defendants contend that factors other than the conspiracy caused the
interruption of trend, they should produce a model that persuasively accounts for
the differences by making a superior projection; explanations that are unquanti-
fled or models designed solely to cast doubt on plaintiffs' projection without being
tendered as sufficiently reliable for a finding should not be sufficient.7 0 Neverthe-
less, if defendants do produce a model purporting to demonstrate that the price
change was due to factors other than the conspiracy, plaintiffs should be entitled to
rebut by showing that the model is defective without producing one of their own.
The same format should be followed, with the parties reversed, when there is
no break in the price trend associated with the beginning or ending of the con-
spiracy, but plaintiffs contend that prices would in fact have changed at that point
if other factors had not concealed the effect of the conspiracy. This was the situa-
tion in Chicken Antitrust. In that event, plaintiffs would need an econometric model
to make their prima facie case and defendants would be entitled to rebut simply
by demonstrating that plaintiffs' model was not reliable.
69. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
70. Of course, nothing should prevent either party from demonstrating that the class-wide figure
determined by regression should not apply to any particular subclass or group of purchasers based on
particular evidence with respect to those purchasers.
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